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INTRODUCTION

A.

The Rise of Close-out Netting

In financial transactions today, a practice called "close-out netting"
plays a key role in controlling and allocating risks.' If anchored in the
parties' chosen contractual language 2 and recognized by law, close-out
* Professor of Law and Director of the Institute on Chinese Law & Business, St.
Mary's University, San Antonio, Texas. B.A., St. Vincent College; J.D., University of
Notre Dame; LL.M., Yale University; LL.M. candidate, London School of Economics
and Political Science ("LSE"). The author gratefully acknowledges the insights into
this topic that he gained in Dr. Philipp Paech's course on International Financial Law
and Practice in the LSE Executive LL.M. Programme.
' See Ole Boger, Close-out Netting Provisions in Private International Law and
InternationalInsolvency Law (Part 1), 18 UNIF. L. REV. 232, 233 (2013) ("Close-out
netting provisions are among the main legal institutions used in market practice to
manage and minimize credit risk.").
2 See Ole Boger, Close-out Netting Provisions in Private International Law and
InternationalInsolvency Law (PartI1), 18 UNIF. L. REV. 532, 534 (2013). In England,
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netting can circumvent normal bankruptcy processes by providing for the
acceleration of mutual obligations and the efficient calculation and settlement of the net balance.'
In effect, close-out netting puts certain fortunate creditors into a posi-

tion of super-priority far preferable to the position of most creditors of a
bankrupt estate. When correctly implemented, close-out netting can
eliminate the risk that arises under ordinary bankruptcy principles-that
a solvent party might incur "a loss equivalent to the gross value of its
claims" against an insolvent counterparty, yet be required to honor its
obligations to that same counterparty in full.4
Of course, everything hinges on whether the transactions are properly
structured and legally permissible. Contractual provisions for the closeout netting of numerous Lehman Brothers' transactions did not save
either that firm or its multitude of counterparties from extensive losses
when they collapsed during the financial crisis of 2007-2009.' Improper
collateralization of underlying transactions constituted one of the main
problems in that debacle. 6 The significance of collateral hinges on its
value, which normally reduces or increases the net amount owed by one
of the parties to the other under a close-out netting agreement.
In developed countries, close-out netting is now a pillar of the law governing financial markets.8 Interestingly, only a few decades ago, both the
"even in the absence of a contractual agreement . .. , broad rules on statutory,
automatic set-off in insolvency are applicable, the effects of which are often regarded
as equivalent to a close-out netting mechanism." Id.
3 See Robert R. Bliss & George G. Kaufman, Derivatives and Systemic Risk:
Netting, Collateral,and Closeout, 2 J. FIN. STABILITY 55, 56 (2006) (close-out netting
"effectively places these contracts outside the normal bankruptcy process").
I See Boger, supra note 1, at 234.
5 See SYLVIE A. DURHAM, DERIVATIVES DESKBOOK: CLOSE-OUT NETT'ING, RISK

MITIGATION, LITIGATION 1-26 to -27 (Kelliann Kavanagh ed., 2d ed. 2014); Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the
Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1044-45 (2009)
(discussing the subprime financial crisis that began in 2007).
6 See DURHAM, supra note 5 ("Lehman Brothers either was not required to post
In other
collateral ... on derivative transactions or posted too little collateral ....
cases, parties lost collateral . . . held by Lehman Brothers or its affiliates."). "From
both Lehman Brothers' perspective and that of its counterparties, close-out netting
did not achieve the optimal results that were intended." Id. at 1-29. Lehman Brothers
and its affiliates were parties to 930,000 derivatives contracts, 733,000 of which were
terminated immediately at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Id. at 6-49.
7 See id. at 6-48 (discussing collateral).
8 Philipp Paech, Enforceability of Close-Out Netting: Draft UNIDROIT Principles
to Set New InternationalBenchmark, BU'ITERWORTH'S J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 13,

14 (Jan. 2013) ("[C]lose-out netting is the legal mechanism underlying the largest part
of modern wholesale financial services.").
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practice and the terminology of close-out netting were essentially
unknown. 9
Although close-out netting is linked to centuries of banking practices
that deal with the setting-off and netting1 ° of obligations in general, it
differs from those relatively simple accounting tools in important
respects. The soundness of basic set-off and netting principles therefore
does not mean that close-out netting is a prudent practice. In addition,
the lessons that can be drawn from international financial crises dating
back as far as 134511 only indirectly shed light on the wisdom and efficacy
of close-out netting. Close-out netting is a modern phenomenon and,
thus, not fully tested' 2 in the 3demanding and ever-changing environment
of global financial practices.1
B.

Sound Public Policy

Lenders, scholars, regulators, and policy makers all support close-out
netting. 4 They assert so frequently that close-out netting plays a vital
9 See BOger, supra note 1, at 234 ("The use of close-out netting has become
common practice.., in the last few decades."); Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 56
("[Close-out] ... is a more recent concept.").
10 See JOANNA BENJAMIN, FINANCIAL LAW 263 (2007) ("Set off and netting are
related legal techniques, applied between persons with mutual rights and liabilities
[that] permit such rights to be used to discharge such liabilities."). "The precise
meaning of 'setoff' and 'netting' have generated a large debate and no conclusions."
Id. at 265.
11 See STEPHEN VALDEZ & PHILIP MOLYNEUX, AN INTRODUCTION TO GLOBAL
FINANCIAL MARKETS 15 (2013) (explaining how the default on a loan by Edward III
in England caused a crash of banking families in Florence and was the "world's
first . . . international banking crisis"); see also The Slumps that Shaped Modern
Finance, ECONOMIST, Apr. 12-18, 2014, at 49, 51 (stating that in 1857, "[a] shock in the
[American] Midwest tore across the country and jumped from New York to Liverpool
and Glasgow, and then London," and "led to crashes in Paris, Hamburg, Copenhagen
and Vienna").
12 See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 56 ("[Tjhere has been very little rigorous
analysis of the economic implications of these provisions for netting.").
13 Cf. HOWARD DAVIES & DAVID GREEN, GLOBAL FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE

8 (2008) ("[A]ny major shock or prolonged downturn will test the
[new] financial architecture in ways for which the existing arrangements may be
unprepared.").
14 See EVA H.G. HUPKES, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANK INSOLVENCY: A
ESSENTIAL GUIDE

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WESTERN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

152 (2000) ("In the field of international financial transactions.., netting is important
because it reduces credit and liquidity risk and, ultimately, systemic risk."); Bliss &
Kaufman, supra note 3, at 56 (noting that "a regulatory and legislative consensus ...
strongly supports" close-out netting); Boger, supra note 1, at 236-37 ("[l]ndustry
representatives and banking regulators alike support the enforceability of close-out
netting ... [and] this positive view ... is shared by national legislators worldwide.").
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role a" in the operation of modern financial markets that this proposition
is now a "truism."" Nevertheless, a few attentive observers of financial
law disagree. They argue that, in its current configuration, close-out netting is unsound,1 7 or at least that it is "not clear"' 8 whether close-out
netting increases or decreases risk in the financial system.1 9 When these
criticisms resonate with readers, it is often because close-out netting is

aimed not at protecting troubled firms facing insolvency, but their solvent
counterparties. Significantly, some key players in international finance,
such as the People's Republic of China,20 are as yet undecided about
whether to endorse close-out netting.
This Article considers whether there is a persuasive case against closeout netting. Part I briefly describes the landscape of international finan15 Cf. BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 21 ("Netting has assumed systemic importance
in the management of financial market credit risk."); Schuyler K. Henderson, Credit
Derivatives, in MODERN FINANCIAL TECHNIQUES, DERIVATIVES AND LAW 7, 44
(Alastair Hudson ed., 2000) ("Termination netting ... is one of the most significant
risk reducing techniques in the derivatives market.").
16 Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 67.
17 See Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 253, 289 (2009) (arguing against changes in U.S. bankruptcy law over the
past thirty years and in favor of a public recordation system).
18 See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 56; see also DURHAM, supra note 5, at 1-29
(asking whether the fall of Lehman Brothers indicates that close-out netting is
fundamentally flawed).
19 See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1049 (2007) (doubting the standard explanation
for special treatment of credit derivatives).
20 Paget Dare Bryan & Gregory J. Lyons, Regulatory Reform Update: Where Are
We Today?, 10th Annual PASLA/RMA Conference on Asian Securities Lending 172
(Mar. 7, 2013), available at http://www.rmahq.org/securities-lending/2013-pasla-rmaconference-on-asian-securities-lending-summary-and-presentations (indicating that in
China the "enforceability of close-out netting is still a question"). But see
Memorandum on Enforceability of Close-Out Netting in China, INT'L SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVE Assoc. (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www2.isda.org/news/memorandum-onenforceability-of-close-out-netting-in-china ("With the Chinese Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law regarding insolvency set ?off right
issued in 2013, China has made great progress toward becoming a netting enforceable
jurisdiction."); see also ISDA Published the New Legal Memorandum on
Enforceability of Close-out Netting of Privately Negotiated Derivatives Transactions
under ISDA Master Agreements in the PRC Prepared by King&Wood Mallesons,
KING&WOOD MALLESONS

(Feb. 2014), http://www.kingandwood.com/bulletin.aspx?

id=banking-newsletter-2014-02-25&language=en (last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (opining
that while "[cilose-out netting is not a legal concept expressly recognized under the
PRC law, nor is it a concept addressed under the Bankruptcy Law," the "election of
Automatic Early Termination in respect of a Chinese counterparty would not be
subject to the administrator's cherry-picking right under Article 18 of the Bankruptcy
Law, and would be enforceable and upheld by PRC courts" under certain
circumstances).

2015]

THE CASE AGAINST CLOSE-OUT NETTING

cial law, the operation of close-out netting, and the legal recognition of
such practices under national and international regimes as well as in
widely used master agreements. Part II then examines the policy arguments in support of close-out netting, in particular the role that close-out
netting plays in minimizing credit risk21 for participants in financial transactions and in reducing systemic risk to financial institutions. Part III
presents the strongest arguments against close-out netting, focusing on
how close-out netting allows excessive externalization of risks, lacks
transparency, operates inconsistently, impacts financial transaction participants disparately, and creates systemic risk by accelerating insolvency
and undercutting efforts to save troubled institutions.

I.
A.

THE OPERATION OF CLOSE-OUT NETTING

FinancialLaw and Its InternationalAspects

As a jurisprudential field, financial law has been described by a leading
scholar as "fragmented," "muddled," and "not universally accepted.. . as
a distinct subject." 2 Even if this is true, however, the charge is not that
coherent principles are lacking, but that the law governing financial transactions is exceedingly complex.
Financial law includes aspects of the "law of the insurance, derivatives,
commercial banking, capital markets and investment management sectors,",2 3 not to mention basic principles of insolvency, commercial, and
property law. The practice of financial law traditionally involved bank
lending and debt securities underwriting, but now includes a third, important practice' 25area: derivative transactions,2 4 often known simply as
"derivatives. "
21

See ERIK

BANKS, THE CREDIT RISK OF COMPLEX DERIVATIVES

38 (3d ed. 2004)

("Credit risk losses can arise from failure by a counterparty to perform on its
contractual . obligations, as a result of unwillingness or inability to pay what is
due.").
22 BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 8.
23 See Lord Woolf, Foreword to BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at vii.
24 See Henderson, supra note 15, at 8-9 ("[Tlhe term 'derivatives' includes three
very different groups of financial products: exchange traded futures and options; debt
securities with an 'unusual' rate of return, where the rate is based on something other
than a fixed rate of interest or a commonly recognized floating rate such as the
London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) . . .; and over-the-counter (OTC),
individually negotiated, bilateral notional amount agreements including swaps,
providing for cash flows based on movements in interest, currency, equity, commodity
or other indices . . . and swap-related products which are, or have characteristics
similar to, options.").
25 Id. at 7-8. A derivative is "an instrument the value of which is derived from
another instrument or product." Id. at 18; see also PHILIP WOOD, LAW AND PRACrICE
OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 425 (2008) ("Most derivative contracts are contracts for
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"Financial law" is shaped by, but is distinct from, the law of "financial
regulation." The latter deals, to a great extent, with bank supervision,
including conditions of entry, capital ratios, liquidity rules, large exposure
rules, foreign exchange controls, and rights of inspection. It also
addresses accounting standards, inside dealer conduct, money laundering,
and investor protection. 6 In contrast, financial law is more about the
rights and obligations of the players in financial transactions than about
the administrative structure and operation of banks and other financial
institutions.2 7
The twin goals of financial law are to foster economic security and
wealth creation by allowing risks to be transferred freely from protection
buyers to risk takers.2 8 These transfers occur in financial markets in the
29
Those
form of contractual arrangements called "financial positions."
30
"funded,"3 1
positions-which are sometimes divided into "simple,"
' 32
3
3
"asset-backed,
and "net"
subcategories-are accorded varying
34
Financial positions are traded
degrees of freedom and legal protection.
on stock exchanges, money markets, bond markets, foreign exchanges,
differences-the difference between the agreed future price of an asset on a future
date and the actual market price on that date.").
26 See DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 13, at 8 (describing financial regulation).
27 See generally BENJAMIN, supra note 10 (discussing financial law as a field of
study).
28 The goals of financial law are sometimes stated more broadly. See WOOD, supra
note 25, at 13-14 (arguing that financial law should lower the risks and costs flowing
from the use of credit be reasonably stable, predictable, comprehensible, and
nondiscriminatory; respect contract and property rights and private ordering; enhance
information for investors; foster investor confidence; mitigate the risk of bank
insolvency; and permit a widening range of transactions).
29 See BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 14 ("The business of financial institutions is to
take risks in exchange for rewards, and they do this by entering into financial
positions.").
30 In "simple positions," such as "guarantees, insurance, derivatives, standby
credits, and performance bonds," there is a risk that the beneficiary of the position
will not be paid, but the beneficiary has not made a capital investment that is at risk.
Id. at 20.
31 In "funded positions," such as "bank loans, capital market investments, and
units in collective investment schemes," the risk is not just that the risk taker will not
be paid, but that the risk taker's capital will be lost. Id. at 21.
32 An "asset-backed position" is a funded position in which assets are identified
and earmarked to meet the claim. Id.
33 A "net position" is one that "arises only where the parties have mutual
obligations, and this mutuality enables each party to use its claim to discharge its
obligation." Id.
34 See id. at 3 ("[T]he function of financial law is to permit risks (and the rewards
associated with taking them) to be transferred from protection buyers to risk takers,
and to circulate . . . in financial markets ... [via] financial positions.").
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and the interbank market.3 5 The aggregate amounts are often staggeringly large, sometimes running into the trillions of dollars.3
Viewed
broadly, financial law is increasingly important because securitization3 7
and credit derivatives 38 draw "ever more categories of business into the
capital markets as an ever-wider range of assets and risks are economi39
cally converted into asset-backed securities.
Some aspects of financial law are undoubtedly "international" in the
sense that legal complexities arise from the global flow of financial assets
in a world that is now highly interconnected,4" both institutionally4 1 and
technologically.4 In particular, banks are more operationally intertwined
35

See

VALDEZ & MOLYNEUX,

supra note 11, at 3.

36 See WooD, supra note 25, at 6-7 ("Foreign exchange

turnover on major
exchanges is probably over $1000 trillion per year ....
In 2005, seven banks had
balance sheets larger than $1 trillion.").
37 BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 28 ("[S]ecuritization involves the economic
translation of a portfolio of income producing assets into debt securities."); VALDEZ
& MOLYNEUX, supra note 11, at 284 ("Before securitization, banks could only make a
limited number of loans based on the size of their balance sheets; however....
[securitization] allowed lenders to sell off their loans to other banks or investors, and
the funds raised could be . . . [used] to make more loans.").
38 BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 73 ("'Credit derivative' is a general term used to
describe various swap and option contracts designed to assume or lay off credit risk
on loans, debt securities and other assets, or in relation to a particular reference entity
or country, in return for either swap payments or payment of premiums.").
39 Letter from Advocis, to Ontario Sec. Comm'n [OSC] (June 1, 2009), availableat
https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Securities-Categoryl-Comments/com_2009
0601_11-753_pollockg.pdf (commenting on the OSC's 2009-2010 Statement of
Priorities); see also BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 25 (stating that an "asset-backed
security" is "a form of investment security in which the rights of investors to payment
are defined and supported by underlying assets").
40 Global economic interconnection has a long history. See, e.g., STEPHEN R.
PLATT, AUTUMN

IN THE HEAVENLY KINGDOM: CHINA, THE WEST, AND THE

Epic

xxiv (2012) ("Karl Marx, in 1853, a London
correspondent for the New-York Daily Tribune" considered the British involvement
in the Taiping rebellion in China and its consequences in the United States to be a
sign "that demonstrated the interconnectedness of the industrial world").
41 One example of institutional global interconnectedness is the rise in
transnational outsourcing of production of goods and services. See, e.g., Vincent R.
Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, Malpractice Liability Related to Foreign Outsourcing
of Legal Services, 2 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MAL. & ETHICS 262, 265 (2012) ("American
law firms increasingly outsource client-related tasks to service providers in foreign
countries.").
42 See FAYE FANGFEI WANG, LAW OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS:
STORY OF THE TAIPING CIVIL WAR

EU, US AND CHINA 6-13 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing the
development of the Internet, electronic commerce, cloud computing, and emerging
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN THE

technologies);

DANIEL

C.K.

BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS:

CHOW

&

THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,

PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS

INTERNATIONAL

14 (2d ed. 2010)

("[T]he information technology revolution, started in the United States in the 1990s,
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than other firms because of the interbank market, derivatives markets,
4 5 are eascredit default swaps,4" and related practices.44 Financial assets
46
ily transferred across borders, sometimes in milliseconds.
However, despite the international aspects of financial transactions, the
legal principles that lie at the heart of financial law are comprised almost
4
entirely of national law. " When cross-border issues arise, the relevant
question is typically not what international agreement governs the dis48
Choice-of-law issues are resolved
pute, but whose national law applies.
49
which differ from
under the principles of "private international law,"

created opportunities for trade and world integration that seemed impossible only a
decade before.").
43 See JEROLD A. FRIEDLAND, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND
FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS 29 (3d ed. 2010) ("[A] credit default swap ...insures one
party (protection buyer) against the risk that a debtor entity (reference entity)
specified in the contract will lose value because of an event that impairs its credit,
such as a bankruptcy default and credit rating downgrade.").
44 See VALDEZ & MOLYNEUX, supra note 11, at 128.
45 Financial assets are intangible assets such as bank deposits, commercial bank
loans, and securities (including bonds and shares). See WOOD, supra note 25, at 3.
46 See id. at 4.
47 In contrast, many aspects of "financial regulation" are international. Cf.
FRIEDLAND, supra note 43, at 17 (discussing "an expanding framework of national,
regional and international rules and enforcement mechanisms to regulate crossborder financial transactions and institutions").
48 See Philipp Paech, Cross-BorderIssues of Securities Law: European Effects to
Support Securities Markets with a Coherent Legal Framework, Briefing for the
European Parliament ECON Committee, at 21-22 (May 2011) (discussing the law
related to securities holding).
49 Chow and Schoenbaum offer a particularly clear definition of private
international law: "[P]rivate international law ... refers to the use of domestic choice
of law rules by domestic courts to resolve issues of conflicts of laws and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in the international context." CHOW &
SCHOENBAUM, supra note 42, at 23; see also John R. Stevenson, The Relationship of
Private InternationalLaw to Public InternationalLaw, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 561-62
(1952) (defining "private international law" to mean "the body of norms applied in
international cases to determine the judicial jurisdiction of a State, the choice of the
particular system or systems of law to be applied in reaching a judicial decision").
Other definitions vary. See Alex Mills, The Identities of Private InternationalLaw:
Lessons from the U.S. and EU Revolutions, 23 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 445, 472
(2013) ("[T]here is a considerable range of different ideas of what private
international law 'is' in the sense of how we should understand its purpose and
function."); Rahim Moloo, Introductory Remarks, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
MEETING (AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.) 337 (2013) (discussing competing definitions and
referring to a panel that considered "private international law: (a) as dealing with
conflicts between laws, and as a technique to deal with those conflicts; and (b) as a
system of law that governs transnational private relations"). Private international law
is called "conflict of laws" in the United States. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 cmt. c (1987).
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one country to the next.5 0 Because financial transactions often span borders, choice of law is an issue of recurring importance. The parties to
close-out netting agreements are often located in different jurisdictions."
There have been efforts to harmonize financial law, particularly within
the countries of the European Union. Various European Community
Directives deal with settlement finality, protection of dealings in financial
collateral, and close-out arrangements. 52 The International Institute for
the Unification of Private Law's ("UNIDROIT") draft principles for
close-out netting may set a new benchmark that will inspire legislators
and regulators worldwide to "remove legal inconsistencies. 53 However,
at present, national law is still dominant in financial law, including the law
54
governing close-out netting.
"

B.

How Close-out Netting Works

In the usual case, close-out netting "serves to close the course of dealings" between parties to a master agreement, which contractually provides for the closing to occur through an acceleration of obligations. The
key elements of close-out netting are "[the] default, the acceleration of
the time for performance of obligations to the time of default, [the] conversion of non-cash obligations into debts, . . . and [the] set-off."5 6 The
master agreement defines what constitutes a "default," such as the failure
to make a required payment, a credit downgrade, or the breach of an
obligation to a third party. As discussed below, the acceleration of obligations is normally not automatic, but occurs only when the non-defaulting party elects to exercise its rights to terminate the agreement.
Close-out netting differs from ordinary principles regarding set-off in
that the relevant agreement "includes elements of termination and acceleration, usually providing for the obligations concerned to become due
and payable upon the occurrence of predefined events, such as default
under one of the obligations covered."5 " Moreover, close-out netting
"requires neither connexity nor maturity, and the objects of the obligations ... need not be identical."5 "
50

See id.

See Stephanie Loizou, Close-out Netting and an Introduction to the UNIDROIT
Principles on Its Enforceability, 27 J.INT'L BANKING L. & REG. 429, 430 (2012).
51

52 See

Roy

GOODE, PRINCIPLES

OF CORPORATE INSOLVENCY LAW

48 (4th ed.

2011).
53 Paech, supra note 8, at 13.
54 See Philipp Paech, Close-Out Netting, Conflict of Law and Insolvency, (Law
Soc'y Econ., Working Paper No. 14/2014, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2414400.
55 BENJAMIN,
56

57
58

supra note 10, at 267.

Id. at 268.
B6ger, supra note 1, at 235-36.
Id. at 236.
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The close-out netting process is now "routine in financial markets and
elsewhere." 59 It has become particularly important in the financial world,
however, because, unlike other businesses, financial institutions engage in

a vast number of bi-directional transactions." ° In fact, close-out netting is
applicable to various types of financial arrangements, provided that the
claims can be reduced to monetary obligations.6 1 Thus, if properly structured, "securities lending and repo6" enjoy similar protection by equal
closeout netting provisions."6 3 That is, if the applicable netting statute
applies to both types of contracts.64
C.

The Legal Foundations of Close-out Netting

The legal effectiveness of close-out netting arrangements depends on
what (if any) legislation has been enacted in the relevant country. Many
developed countries have passed laws to ensure that netting arrangements are enforceable in cases where one of the parties becomes insolvent.6 5 In Europe, a "major incentive" in implementing legal recognition
of close-out netting was that "netting would be taken into account in the
calculations of capital requirements [of banks] provided that certain qualifying factors were met.",66 European legislation nonetheless remains
only partially harmonized.6 7
In some countries, special netting provisions have been added to banking laws or bankruptcy laws. 68 For example, the United States has a fed51 Comm'rs for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs v. Enron Eur. Ltd., [2006]

EWHC 824 (Ch) (Eng.).
60 See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 58 (commenting that in ordinary business
relations, "firms either buy or sell to other firms, but rarely do both simultaneously").
61 See GOODE, supra note 52, at 285 ("[I]nsolvency set-off.., requires that claims
and cross-claims be monetary claims.").
62 "Repo" is short for "sale and repurchase transaction."

BENJAMIN,

supra note 10,

at 308. "A repo is an agreement that A will purchase securities from B at a certain
date, with a simultaneous agreement that B will repurchase equivalent securities from
A at a later date.... The traditional function of a repo is to serve as an informal
alternative to a secured loan." Id.
63 Andre Ruchin, Can Securities Lending Transactions Substitute for Repurchase
Agreement Transactions?, 128 BANKING L.J. 450, 462 (2011).
64 Cf. Henderson, supra note 15, at 45 (discussing how netting statutes vary in
terms of what kinds of financial contracts are covered).
65 See HUPKES, supra note 14, at 153 (point stated); Netting Legislation - Status,
INT'L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES Assoc., http://isda.org/docproj/stat-of-netleg.html
(last visited Jan. 5, 2015) (listing countries that have adopted or are considering closeout netting legislation).
66 See HOPKES, supra note 14, at 153.
67 B~ger, supra note 2, at 533. For a survey of the law of England, France,
Germany, and Spain, see id. at 533-47.
68 HUPKES, supra note 14, at 154.
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eral netting statute,6 9 and special netting provisions have been added to
state laws.7" American laws generally exempt close-out netting agreements "by means of specific safe harbor provisions" 71 from the usual
principles governing insolvency. The federal law that deals with close-out
netting specifies which financial institutions and obligations are covered,'7 provides that bilateral7 3 and multilateral clearinghouse 7 ' netting
75
arrangements are enforceable, preempts inconsistent injunctive relief,
76
and elaborates the relationship of these provisions to other laws.

The European Commission has stated that "[c]lose-out netting is
important for the efficiency of financial markets, as it reduces credit risk
and enables financial institutions either to reduce their regulatory
required capital and/or increase their exposure."77 In fact, several EU
measures afford legal protection to close-out netting, including the Settlement Finality Directive,7" the Winding Up Directive,7 9 the Insolvency
Regulation," ° and the Financial Collateral Directive. 8 Today, the principle of close-out netting is "well established" in all EU Member States,
82
although legal specifics and their applications vary.
One author estimates that there is "a clear trend" towards the enforceability of close-out netting agreements internationally. 83 However, closeout netting provisions are so commonly used in cross-border transactions,
and relevant national laws vary to such an extent,84 that parties must
carefully structure their close-out netting agreements in ways that maximize the likelihood of enforceability.85 This is because "the determina69

12 U.S.C. §§ 4401-4407 (2006).

70

Boger, supra note 2, at 548.

71

Id.

12 U.S.C. § 4402 (2006).
Id. § 4403.
74 Id. § 4404.
75 Id. § 4405.
76 Id. §§ 4406-4407.
77 Report from the Commission to the Council and European Parliament,
Evaluation Report on the Financial CollateralArrangements Directive, at 10, COM
72
73

(2006) 833 final (Dec. 20, 2006).
78 Council Directive 98/26, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 45 (EC).
79 Council Directive 2001/24, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 15 (EC).
80 Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 J.0. (160) 1 (EC).
81 Council Directive 2002/47, 2002 O.J. (L 168) 43 (EC). The named Directives are
examples of the European Union's continuing efforts to grapple with the legal
consequences of globalization. See also Vincent R. Johnson, Regional Sales Law in a
World of Global Transactions, 1 CHINESE J. CoMp. L. 426, 426 (2013) (discussing the

proposed Common European Sales Law ("CESL")).
82 BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 270.
83

Boger, supra note 1, at 234.

84 Paech, supra note 8, at 17 (stating that in about forty jurisdictions, "the scope

and legal effects of close-out netting differ significantly").
85 Boger, supra note 1, at 234.
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tion of the law governing the operation of a close-out netting provision
remains of core importance."8 6 Major trade associations offer legal opinions on "the effectiveness of the close out [netting] provisions of their
87
standard documentation" under the law of a wide range of jurisdictions.
This makes it easier for lawyers to craft close-out netting agreements that
will be enforceable.
D.

The Role of Master Agreements

In international financial transactions by banks and other institutions,
close-out netting is usually based on master agreements. Master agreements are designed to minimize or eliminate legal uncertainties. 8 The
2002 International Swap Dealers Association ("ISDA") Master Agreement, based largely on New York law,89 is "one of the most widely used
in the world and contains detailed provisions on netting."9 Whatever the
form of the master agreement, the parties usually choose English or New
York law to govern their close-out netting activities.9 1

II.

THE CASE FOR CLOSE-OUT NETTING

The case for close-out netting is twofold. Close-out netting is said to
mitigate both "counterparty risk on particular transactions" (i.e., "credit
risk") and "systemic risk to the entire financial system. "92
A.

Reducing Credit Risk

93
Close-out netting contractual arrangements greatly reduce credit risk
for participants in financial transactions by minimizing "exposures on
open contracts if one party should become insolvent or a like event
occurs before the settlement date." 94 Thus, such provisions make it easier for persons to take financial positions that they believe will maximize
their wealth. By doing so, close-out netting produces a private good for
the parties to financial transactions, and a public good, to the extent that
a greater volume of transactions is likely to produce greater wealth in

86 Id. at 237; see also id. at 238-50 (discussing private international law aspects of
close-out netting provisions).
87 BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 269.
88
89
90
91

See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 58.
HUPKES, supra note 14, at 153.
See GOODE, supra note 52, at 286.
See Boiger, supra note 1, at 237.
92 DURHAM, supra note 5, at 6-2.

93 "Credit risk" is the "risk of a debt not being paid or another obligation not being
performed." BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 3.

94 Comm'rs for Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs v. Enron Eur. Ltd., [2006]
EWHC 824 (Ch) (Eng.).
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general.9" These benefits may be considerable because estimates suggest
that close-out netting reduces total credit risk by as much as eighty-five
percent.9 6
The absence of close-out netting would produce inefficiencies. Closeout netting enables parties to a derivatives contract to avoid future fluctuations in value by closing out their positions when a counterparty
becomes insolvent.9" If that option were not available, these market participants would constantly have to spend resources to rebalance hedged
positions during the "long and unpredictable" period of time that bankruptcy proceedings might be pending.98 In addition, during that period,
collateral posted against
net positions "would effectively become useless
99
if it were frozen."
B.

Minimizing Systemic Risk

The strongest argument for close-out netting is that close-out netting is
an efficient process that reduces systemic risk, which could otherwise lead
to failure of the financial system x00 "Systemic risk occurs where market
participants are exposed to each other's failure in such a way that the
inability of one financial market participant to meet its obligations when
due will1 cause other participants to fail to meet their obligations when
10
due.
In the banking sector of financial law, the underlying regulatory structure is "fragile by design., 11 2 The legal requirements that govern the
95 See Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 60 ("Closeout makes netting and
collateral more effective, and thus leads to further expansion of the market."); Paech,
supra note 8, at 15 ("The widespread use of netting agreements ...could free funds,
which would in turn increase market liquidity ... [as well as] the competitiveness of
individual banks and of entire financial market places.").
96 Boger, supra note 1, at 234.
97 Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 64.
98 Id. "The solvent party would not know whether it was hedged or not." Id. at 65.
99 Id. at 64.
100 See id. at 66-67 (discussing that as applied to derivatives, "[piroponents of legal
protection of closeout netting . . .argue that: (1) derivatives markets are especially
critical to the smooth functioning of the financial system; (2) derivatives markets are
particularly susceptible to systemic failures due to the volatile nature of the value of
derivatives contracts; and (3) closeout netting and collateral protection ameliorate
these risks and so are justified on public policy grounds").
101 Paech, supra note 8, at 16; see also Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 66
(asserting that there is "[nlo single generally-agreed [upon] definition of what
constitutes systemic risk," but discussing "three potential types of market disruption:
cascading failures, large macro-economic shocks, and common-shock market
disruption/liquidity contraction").
102 See generally CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY
DESIGN: THE ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES & SCARCE CREDIT

12 (2014).
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operation of banks have been shaped by political compromise 10 3 and are
often far from ideal. This makes banking systems particularly vulnerable
to the problems that systemic risk creates. Bank "liquidity problems can
lead to solvency problems .

.

. [and a] relatively small shock can cause

liquidity to dry up and create [a] financial cris[i]s."' 4 Bank payment systems and interbank deposit markets are tightly linked, especially in the
context of short-term borrowing.1" 5 Such linkages create the risk that a
"domino effect" will otherwise cause problems of an essentially local
nature to spread systemic risk throughout the banking system. 10 6 Today,
systemic risk can topple banking institutions regionally, nationally, and
even globally.10 7
The resulting reduction in total credit risk "also effectively reduces the
risk of creating or increasing financial difficulties for counterparties
caused by the inability of one of the market participants to meet its obligations."'1 8 That risk to counterparties can lead to successive "failures of
other market participants. "'109 A chain of defaults caused by the failure
of one major participant in derivative transactions might "lead to turmoil
in the underlying securities, commodities, or interest rate markets from
which derivatives derive their value." 110
Avoiding this "contagion effect" and the related "systemic risk" is what
makes close-out netting important from a financial institution perspective."' The 2007-2009 financial crisis might have been "far worse" if a
bankruptcy stay had prevented the parties to nearly three quarters of a
million Lehman Brothers contracts from closing out their obligations.1 1
Just as the tort systems in many developed countries work reasonably
103 See id. at 3-4 ("[Plolitics ...
banking crises.").
104 VALDEZ & MOLYNEUX,
105

determines whether societies suffer repeated

supra note 11, at 132.

WOOD, supra note 25, at 11; see also Roy

MCKENDRICK

INTERNATIONAL

&

JEFFREY

INSTRUMENTS

WOOL,

AND

GOODE, HERBERT

TRANSNATIONAL

COMMENTARY

691

KRONKE,

COMMERCIAL

(2004)

(noting

EWAN
LAW:

that

"settlement arrangements involve[] systemic risks" that "are heightened in the
context of transnational transactions").
106 See VALDEZ & MOLYNEUX, supra note 11, at 133. "[C]ross-border claims
between banks at the end of 2009 reached US $5.9 trillion." Id. at 135.
107 Id. at 132 ("[S]ystemic risk in a global context did not materialize until 2007.");
DURHAM, supra note 5, at 7-3 ("The bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc. . . . on September 15, 2008, illustrated the global financial risk that a single
market participant could pose to the global financial system when entering insolvency
proceedings.").
108 Boger, supra note 1, at 234.
109 Id.
110

DURHAM,

supra note 5, at 6-2.

1 Boger, supra note 1, at 234.
112 DURHAM, supra note 5, at 7-3.
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well because most cases settle, 113 the financial and insolvency systems in
developed countries may operate efficiently only because a vast multitude of obligations are resolved via close-out netting.
The ability of close-out netting to minimize the risk of systemic failure
largely depends on whether the relevant legislation effectively immunizes
close-out netting from the "so-called cherry-picking provisions typically
found in national bankruptcy laws.' 1 14 Such provisions normally allow a
receiver or liquidator in bankruptcy to affirm executory contracts that are
favorable to the bankruptcy estate, and to disaffirm transactions that are
disadvantageous. If such "cherry-picking" is allowed, some argue, a "solvent counter-party may not be able to absorb the shortfall and may
default on its own obligations."' 5 This default may cause a dangerous
chain reaction throughout the financial system. That kind of domino
effect can be prevented by exempting close-out netting transactions from
the bankruptcy rules that otherwise allow "cherry-picking" to maximize
the size of the bankruptcy estate for purposes of reorganization or for the
benefit of creditors. In sum, the argument for close-out netting is that
applying the usual rules of insolvency law to certain financial transactions
"could adversely affect the efficient functioning of the market and
thereby produce systemic risk.""' 6
Ill.

THE CASE AGAINST CLOSE-OUT NETTING

Despite the role that close-out netting plays in minimizing credit risk
and systemic risk, it is still unclear whether the benefits of close-out netting outweigh the costs. This is true because close-out netting allows risktakers to externalize the costs of their activities to innocent third persons.
The close-out netting process also lacks transparency, operates inconsistently, disparately impacts participants in financial transactions, and creates systemic risk by accelerating insolvency and impeding the rescue of
troubled institutions.
A.

Excessive Externalization of Risk

The strongest argument against close-out netting is that the process
does little or nothing to minimize the risks that large-scale financial transactions create; rather, close-out netting merely shifts those risks to other
113 See VINCENT

R.

JOHNSON, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW

38 (5th

ed. 2013)

("The vast majority of tort cases are resolved through settlement rather than
litigation; the percentage is often put at 95 percent or higher.").
114 HUPKES, supra note 14, at 153; see also DURHAM, supra note 5, at 7-6 ("Absent

the special protections afforded to derivative contracts and other financial
arrangements, a debtor may 'cherry-pick' the contracts it wishes to assume, creating
an inequitable opportunity for use of hindsight by the debtor and the shifting of
market risk of open transactions to counterparties.").
115 See HUPKES, supra note 14, at 153.
116 GOODE,

supra note 52, at 48.
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persons who have no choice in the matter.11 7 Thus, close-out netting
"between A and B transfers credit risk from A to B's general creditors,
and from B to A's general creditors."1'18 This shift is unfair because A
and B will retain, to a great extent, the potential benefits of the underlying transactions, while their general creditors, who do not directly benefit
from the creation of those positions, will bear much of the cost if the
transactions fail.
In other words, close-out netting creates a world that bears little resemblance to reality. By accelerating mutual obligations and reducing all liability to the calculation of a net sum that is to be paid or received, closeout netting pretends that a multitude of transactions between the parties
to a close-out netting agreement only creates risks to those parties. In
fact, those transactions create numerous other risks, including the risk
that persons outside the transactions, who otherwise deal with those parties, will be adversely affected if the transactions fail. 9 Moreover, in the
case of banks, close-out netting often results in understated capitalization
requirements and thus makes it more likely that individual banks will collapse and jeopardize the global financial system.
Under basic principles of tort jurisprudence, enterprises should be
forced to internalize the costs of their activities because only then will
those enterprises make an honest calculation of whether risky activitiessuch as transactions involving credit derivatives and asset-backed securities-are truly worthwhile.1 2 It makes little sense for the law to allow
financial institutions to create instruments that entail substantial risks
and, at the same time, immunize those institutions from the very bundle
of risks that they have created while leaving nonparties vulnerable.
The institutions that are likely to benefit from marketing a bewilderingly complex array' of risky financial products should be required to
bear a fair share of the risks and the resulting losses. However, close-out
netting severs the critical link between potential benefits and potential
losses. This disconnection not only threatens to distort major players'
exercise of judgment in the financial markets, but also unfairly thrusts the
117 See BENJAMIN, supra note 10, at 266 ("[F]inancial law cannot reduce risk, but
only moves it from person to person."); see also id. at 16.
118 Id. at 266.
119 Cf. DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 13, at 8 ("[W]hen risks [created by

derivatives] crystallize, they may have an impact in hitherto unfamiliar places,
anywhere in the globe.").
120 Cf. Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: A
Response to Market Manipulation, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 239, 284 (2000)
(explaining how requiring persons to internalize the costs of their activities influences
both activity levels and care levels).
12 See DAVIES & GREEN, supra note 13, at 8 ("New instruments have emerged
which make it possible to transfer risk of all kinds on a far larger scale and in more
complex ways, not solely through standardized exchange-traded derivatives, but
through an almost infinite range of bespoke, over-the-counter arrangements.").
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costs of risky financial practices on unwitting general creditors who will
never enjoy a fair share of the potential benefits and have no say in the
transfer of risk.
The way to mitigate the frequency and severity of future financial crises
is to put "risk back into the private sector. 1 22 Far from doing that, closeout netting increases the likelihood that future crises will occur and cause
unnecessary losses by disconnecting the potential for profit from the
potential for loss in financial transactions that often involve vast amounts
of money.
Lack of Transparency

B.

The applicable law in many countries minimizes legal formalities for
the creation of close-out netting agreements. 123 No public declarations or
filings are required. It is unlikely that the general creditors of a financial
institution will ever know the magnitude of the risks to which they are
being subjected to by the existence of close-out-netting agreements
between that institution and its favored counterparties. 2 4 This is particularly true where the transactions underlying such agreements, e.g., credit
default swaps, are themselves "an ideal vehicle for hidden leverage and
secret liens because of their inherent complexity ...

[and] limited disclo-

derivasure."' 125 In addition, basic information about over-the-counter
126
tives is difficult to obtain and mandatory disclosures are rare.
Close-out netting arrangements lack transparency. Thus, without any
meaningful consent on their part, general creditors are forced to bear a
larger share of the losses that occur soon after a party that is protected by
a close-out agreement defaults, cashes in its chips, and leaves the table,
even as its counterparty fails.
Although financial law is animated by arm's length, caveat emptor principles, rather than by fiduciary or pro-consumer ideals, 2 7 many wellestablished legal rules-namely, good faith disclosure requirements, prospectus laws, and market transparency standards-support the idea that
risk takers should be liable for market losses only if the losses resulted
122

123

The Slumps that Shaped Modern Finance, supra note 11, at 54.
Cf. Paech, supra note 8, at 17 (indicating that recent intergovernmental

negotiations settled on the principle that "no formal requirement other than writing
should be required").
124 Cf. DURHAM, supra note 5, at 8-14 ("Parties to highly confidential derivative
transactions may not want to file UCC financing statements that will identify the
existence and main collateral terms of the derivative transaction, because these filings
become a matter of public record.").
125 Simkovic, supra note 17, at 272; cf. id. at 284-85 (explaining why AIG's
creditors were unaware of AIG's credit default swap exposure).
126

Id. at 274-75.

127 BENJAMIN,

supra note 10, at 16 (differentiating approaches to regulation).
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from decisions that were entered into with informed consent. 12 8 These
same considerations make it unfair for general creditors of an insolvent
institution to bear an enhanced share of the losses that result from insolvency that occurs in the context of close-out netting.
Typically, close-out netting agreements are secret and essentially undiscoverable by third parties. Yet, transparency plays an important role in
guiding the operation of financial markets.12 9 The lack of transparency in
close-out netting agreements, and the danger that it poses to market participants, is a legitimate reason for the law to decline to honor such highly
preferential arrangements that are intended to circumvent well-established bankruptcy principles. 130 Those principles are rooted in the sound
idea that, in cases of insolvency, the greatest good will be achieved by
mustering the assets of the insolvent party and salvaging that enterprise if
possible. 13 ' In contrast, close-out netting is a self-interested practice,
which allows a counterparty to dismember and abandon an entity at the
first sign of distress that amounts
to any one of several kinds of default,
132
such as a credit downgrade.
C. Inconsistency and Opaqueness
The problems with close-out netting agreements are not merely their
lack of transparency and nondisclosure of material information. Far
worse, close-out netting agreements are both deliberately opaque and
unpredictable in operation. Parties to close-out netting agreements are
given a great deal of freedom to define their terms by specifying, for
example, what constitutes a default sufficient to trigger the closing-out
process. 1 3 While this flexible arrangement can be praised as consistent
128

Id. at 17 (offering these examples).

129

Cf. FIN.

STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON

INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE 57 (2008) (setting forth
recommendations for improving transparency in securitization processes and
markets).
130 See Simkovic, supra note 17, at 289-90 (arguing that creditors seeking priority
in bankruptcy need to be forced to disclose publicly their claims in full and that
Congress should establish a universal "recordation" system for any instrument that
gives a creditor greater priority than that of a general unsecured creditor).
131 See Stephen J. Lubben, Derivatives and Bankruptcy: The Flawed Case for
Special Treatment, 12 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 61,63 (2009) ("The cost imposed by chapter 11
is a cost imposed on all unsecured creditors, resulting from a plausible policy
judgment that the collective gains from the organization process exceed these costs.").
132 See Robert R. Bliss, Bankruptcy Law and Large Complex Financial
ENHANCING

MARKET AND

Organizations: A Primer, ECON.

PERSPECTIVES, Q1 2003, at 48, 49 (1Q/2003)

(discussing the risk of dismemberment of an insolvent corporation and loss of value).
133 See DURHAM, supra note 5, at 8-3 (discussing "which entities should be utilized

as specified entities for purposes of default"). There are numerous events that may be
deemed to be a default of a master agreement, including failure to pay or deliver,
breach or repudiation of the agreement, credit support default, misrepresentation,
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with the ideal of "private ordering,"1" 4 it means that the operation of
financial and insolvency law is far from predictable. In some instances, an
adverse credit event affecting an affiliated entity is sufficient to justify
termination and acceleration of mutual obligations; in other cases, it is
not. There is no way for affected third parties to know much about when
they are likely to be drawn into a maelstrom of close-out netting which,
by accelerating obligations between the parties, may thrust one of those
parties into bankruptcy.
The complexities that surround close-out netting agreements are a
product not just of the terms of the agreements, but also of the application of those provisions. Without an international convention, the current variations in nationally-based close-out netting laws inject layers of
legal uncertainty into global financial transactions. In addition, in many
countries, such as the United States, close-out netting is not a mandatory
or automatic regime, but an optional process.135 Parties have the freedom to shape their agreements and rarely apply a rule of automatic early
13 6
termination to complex derivative transactions.
In cases where an event of default or termination is of a continuing
nature, a non-defaulting party to a master agreement ordinarily can elect
not to accelerate and close out, if that would be disadvantageous to that
party. That might be true, for example, when the non-defaulting party
would owe a net balance to the insolvent party. The right to close out can
therefore be reserved for a later, more advantageous moment. In such
instances, from the standpoint of the non-defaulting party, the operation
of close-out netting is likely to be wholly self-interested. If it is better for
the non-defaulting party to close out, that party will probably choose to
close out. If it is better for the non-defaulting party not to close out, the
party may not choose to close out. The non-defaulting party has no obligation to consider the welfare of the defaulting party or of potentially
affected creditors. The consequences of ignoring the welfare of third parties can be considerable. Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy counsel estimated that "billions of dollars were lost to the bankruptcy estate"
because "[s]ome counterparties who owed Lehman Brothers money on
default under specific transactions, cross-default, bankruptcy, and merger with
assumption. See id. at 2-25 to -30 (setting forth a chart).
134 See Jay M. Feinman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ.
L. REV. 813, 814 (2006) (discussing the logic of private ordering).
135 See DURHAM, supra note 5, at 1-28 ("A non-defaulting party has the option to
terminate a derivative contract but is not obliged to do so."). "One important feature
of the master agreements is that an event of default can only occur if the nondefaulting party elects to declare an event of default or termination event. Unless the
parties have negotiated automatic early termination.. . derivative transactions do not
terminate automatically." Id. at 2-22; see also id. at 8-17 (discussing the option of nontermination).
136 See id. at 2-14 (indicating that "most parties elect not to"); id. at 2-15
(discussing difficulties caused by automatic termination).
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simply chose not to terminate the derivative
derivative transactions
137
transactions."

If it is wrong for a bankruptcy administrator to "cherry pick" transactions to save a distressed entity, it is doubly wrong for a party to a closeout netting agreement to decide whether to accelerate obligations in a
way that increases the likelihood that a distressed institution will fail. 3 '
Reflecting a modicum of skepticism about according selected categories
of counterparties a preferential right to close out and avoid bankruptcy
obligations, some courts have held that if a party to a close-out netting
agreement fails to close out promptly when a counterparty becomes
insolvent, the party waives the right to do so at a later time even if the
default is of a continuing nature.' 39
D.

Disparate Treatment

Close-out netting disproportionately favors large institutions. Banks
are eligible to enter into close-out netting agreements in all "netting
friendly" jurisdictions. 140 In many such places, so are "insurance companies, investment firms, hedge funds, proprietary traders, pension funds,
central banks, public authorities, [and] international financial institutions. '1 4' In contrast, non-financial corporate entities are eligible only in
certain cases.' 4 2 Even if small institutions qualify for the favored treatment of close-out netting under insolvency laws, the transactional costs
are often so prohibitive as to effectively exclude them. 143 Further,
"[i]ndividual natural
persons.., are generally only eligible under limited
44
circumstances."1

It is possible to defend the close-out netting eligibility requirements
that favor large institutions on the ground that it is large institutions, not
small ones, whose potential failure poses the greatest threat to the financial system. Yet it is easy to see the legal disparity and the problems that
flow from disparate treatment. There are costs inherent in the idea that
some institutions are above the law (of bankruptcy), entitled to preferential treatment (via accelerated close-out netting), and too big to fail.
137

Id. at 1-28.

In some instances, driving a business into insolvency may give rise to tort
liability. See Vincent R. Johnson, Tortious Interference with Business Interests: An
American Perspective, 3 J. Bus. & L. 29 (2014) (discussing relevant factors).
138

139

See DURHAM, supra note 5, at 2-25 (discussing the United States).

140 Paech, supra note 8, at 16.
141 Id.
142
143

Id. at 17.
See DURHAM, supra note 5, at 8-2 ("A single financing and related hedging

derivative contract would not warrant the time and cost of putting a master netting
agreement in place."). "For parties with multiple financial agreements and derivative
contracts ... a master netting agreement should be considered." Id. at 8-3.
144 Paech, supra note 8, at 17.
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Equality before the law is a principle widely honored and easily understood. 145 According super-priority to large institutions by allowing them
to engage in close-out netting under conditions largely exempt from
insolvency law 146 is a suspect practice because it offends the equality
principle.
Exceptionally large entities that are sometimes known as "systemically
important financial institutions" ("SIFIs") transfer vast quantities of capital and related risks across international borders. 147 For example, banks
perform key roles as depositories for savings, conduits for linking borrowers and lenders, suppliers of credit, and providers of payment facilities.' 4 8
SIFIs are typically "very big and international," as well as "extremely
complex," often with "at least 100 subsidiaries.' ' 1 49 It is not clear how
they should be regulated. Yet, a system that insulates SIFIs from widely
applied principles of insolvency law, and allows them to externalize the
risks of failure that are inherent in their complex transactions, creates an
inevitable moral hazard that will likely harm the operation of those institutions.15 ° Moreover, if laws give the largest institutions favorable special
treatment, banks and other financial entities will have a troublesome
5
incentive to become large and take on too much risk.' '
In addition, the preferential treatment of large institutions erodes public respect for both the government and the justice system because it
undermines the ideal of equality before the law.'
Thus, aside from
whether close-out netting creates systemic risks, close-out netting threat-

115 Cf Vincent R. Johnson & Stephen C. Loomis, The Rule of Law in China and
the Prosecution of Li Zhuang, 1 CHINESE J. COMP. L. 1, 12 (2013) ("[T]he rule of law
demands that a legal system ...treat all persons equally.").
146 See Boger, supra note 1, at 236 ("Close-out netting provisions have been
argued to be in conflict with the general system of insolvency preferences.").
147 VALDEZ

&

MOLYNEUX,

supra note 11, at 136.

See WooD, supra note 25, at 9. It is argued that credit "alleviates poverty,"
"facilitates development," "stimulates investment, production, buying power and
economic growth," encourages savings by providing revenues for savers, and locates
resources where they are needed. Id. at 9-10.
148

149 VALDEZ & MOLYNEUX, supra note 11, at 136.

150 Id. at 138 ("If SIFIs cannot fail, government support is inevitable and the

problem of moral hazard is exacerbated.").
151 Id. at 130.
152 See Vincent R. Johnson, Corruption in Education:A Global Legal Challenge,
48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 23 (2008) ("[P]erceived unfairness, dishonesty, or
unequal treatment threatens public confidence in, and indeed the survival of,
important institutions.").
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political systems, which require public confidence to
ens the legal 153 and 154
function effectively.

Moreover, even if a case can be made for protecting the largest and
most vital financial institutions, there is a problem of "mission creep." In
the United States, for example, aggressive lobbying 15 caused a vast
expansion of the "safe harbor" provisions in the bankruptcy code,'1 56 so
that close-out netting agreements related to most forms of derivatives are
now exempt from ordinary insolvency principles. 1 57 The widening of the
bankruptcy exceptions for derivatives "degraded the value of those
exceptions as protection against investment bank failures' ' 1 58 and produced "windfall gifts to the financial industry.' ' 159 Those "reforms"
appear to be better explained by the political power of large institutions
and their lobbyists 16 ° than by their functionality in the financial world.

Close-out netting also adversely impacts trade in financial services with
less developed countries because netting-friendly law is found mostly in
the industrialized world. The very favorable legal treatment available to
financial institutions in developed countries undoubtedly discourages
financial institutions from doing business with financial services providers
located in the comparatively netting-unfriendly developing world.
E. Accelerated Insolvency and Systemic Risk
Close-out netting agreements pose a great risk of thrusting some financial institutions prematurely into bankruptcy. This not only endangers
specific institutions, but also creates a risk of precipitating an adverse
153 Cf Vincent R. Johnson, The Rule of Law and Enforcement of Chinese Tort
Law, 34 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 45, 75 (2011) ("Rule of Law demands that a legal
system operate in a way that commands public respect. This is true because the
success of a peaceful substitute for unlawful forms of dispute resolution depends upon
the perceived legitimacy of the alternative.").
154 Cf. Vincent R. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy,
16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 101, 115-16 (2006) [hereinafter Johnson, Regulating
Lobbyists] ("Perceived corruption, like corruption itself, can destroy a democratic
institution."); see also Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Government at the Local Level,
36 SETON HALL L. REV. 715, 735 (2006) ("[T]he appearance of impropriety is often as
destructive of public confidence in government as impropriety itself.").
155 See Simkovic, supra note 17, at 279 ("[T]he derivatives industry has sought to
protect itself by persuading Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code.").
156 See Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors,18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV.
319, 319 (2010) (referencing the expansion of safe harbor provisions).
157 See id. at 324-26 (establishing that derivatives contracts are exempt from the
provision in the U.S. Bankruptcy Code prohibiting the termination of most contracts
simply because the debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition).
158 Simkovic, supra note 17, at 279.
159 Lubben, supra note 156, at 321.
160 Cf. Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists, supra note 154, at 112-13 (discussing the

"dark side of lobbying").
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domino effect of firm failures throughout financial systems. Despite
these dangers, the law in netting-friendly jurisdictions insulates the financial institutions that assert their close-out rights from obligations under
the law of insolvency. This is true regardless of the magnitude of the risks
created by their activities and financial products. The special treatment
accorded to credit derivatives by applicable insolvency laws may well
increase systemic risk "because it eliminates a possible curb on counterparties' rush to close out their contracts in the event of a wave of
failures." 16' 1
Risks related to accelerated insolvency arise from the broad definitions
that are employed in widely used master agreements. Those definitions
sometimes define "default" as including "events of default under other
financial agreements or instruments with the same party or with a party's
credit support provider or other related parties." 16 The standard definitions are so broad that they capture transactions that are done with entities other than the parties to the master agreement. Thus, if A and B are
parties to a master agreement, A can close out all transactions with B
simply because B has defaulted under a separate, unrelated transaction
with C. 6 Armed with these kinds of potentially far-reaching provisions,
a non-defaulting party can launch a "preemptive" strike by treating a
counterparty's default on an unrelated agreement as a "red flag" indicating that it may also default on its transactions and then initiating the
close-out netting process.16 4
Thus, the consequences of a party being declared in default under one
close-out netting agreement can be "catastrophic." 16' 5 The "cross-default
provisions in [other] master agreements virtually ensure" that "all [other]
166
counterparties will close out.'
The risk is not only that technically solvent financial institutions will be
thrust into bankruptcy, 167 but that valuable assets may be lost at "firesale" prices.1 68 In addition, the preferential treatment accorded to parties
exercising their rights under close-out netting agreements will impede the
mustering of assets and make it more difficult for bankruptcy administrators to manage insolvency.1 69 Thus, the system decreases the likelihood
that distressed institutions will be restored to economic viability.
161 Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 19, at 1049.
162 DURHAM, supra note 5, at 2-7.
163 Id. at 2-8 (offering a similar illustration).
164 Id. at 2-7.
165 Id. at 2-3.
166 Bliss & Kaufman, supra note 3, at 68 (discussing demands for collateral).
167 See id. ("Even if the firm is technically solvent ... the closeout process can
nonetheless harm the economic viability of the firm.").
168 Id.
169 Bliss, supra note 132, at 56 ("[T]he combination of rapidly developing
insolvency, opaque financial instruments positions, and the exemption from stays of
contracts has the potential to preempt the usual options open to regulators and
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The danger is really two-fold. First, harm will be produced by a party's
proper exercise of its rights under a close-out netting agreement. Second,
harm will also result from erroneous assertions of rights. Parties who
erroneously declare counterparties to be in default may trigger "cascading chain[s] of cross-defaults."' 7 ° A leading treatise suggests that a party
to a close-out netting agreement "faces significant liability if it terminates
on the basis of a default ... which has not occurred."'' In fact, that is
not true under American law, where negligent interference with economic interests is generally not actionable,' 7 2 and a good faith assertion
of legal rights, even if erroneous, is normally protected by at least a qualified privilege.17 There is little reason to think that a party who incorrectly declares a default will be liable for economic harm caused to third
persons. Consequently, under American jurisprudence, the prospect of
tort liability does little to deter parties to financial transactions from
entering into or exercising their actual or perceived rights under close-out
netting agreements. The threat of tort liability does not significantly minimize the risk of harm to third persons who may become the casualties of
a sequence of financial failures precipitated by close-out netting.
The close-out netting process entails many risks. The process makes it
difficult for troubled financial institutions to avoid insolvency, difficult for
insolvency administrators to salvage distressed firms and their assets, and
difficult for the financial system to insulate sound entities from systemic
risks. Viewed holistically, the close-out netting process is itself a source
of systemic risk.
CONCLUSION

Although there are legitimate arguments in favor of close-out netting,
there are also real concerns about whether those arguments have been
overstated and whether expansive legal protection for close-out netting
exacts too high a cost. These competing considerations cannot be matherisks (financial and
matically weighed and balanced because the relevant
1 74
otherwise) are difficult or impossible to measure.
courts."); cf. Paech, supra note 8, at 18 ("[T]he unrestricted exercise of termination
rights ... has the potential of harming the competent authority's aim of ensuring the
orderly resolution of the relevant institution.").
170 DURHAM, supra note 5, at 2-10.
171 Id. at 2-10 to -11.
172 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766C (1979); see also VINCENT R.
ADVANCED TORTS: A PROBLEM APPROACH 443-44 (2d ed. 2014)
(discussing tortious interference with networks of contracts).
173 See Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 215 (Tex. 1996);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 773 (1979).
17 Cf. Philipp Paech, Market Needs as Paradigm:Breaking Up the Thinking on EU
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In the end, lawmakers must exercise sound judgment regarding the
degree of legal recognition that should be afforded to close-out netting.
There are no clear answers, but there are certainly red flags.
The danger signals include aggressive lobbying by financial institutions
for special treatment; lack of transparency regarding the terms of closeout netting agreements and underlying transactions; inconsistency, haste,
and opaqueness in closing-out processes; disparate legal treatment favoring large institutions and allowing excessive externalization of risk by certain financial transaction participants; and obstacles that render
insolvency resolution processes more necessary but less effective. These
are legitimate concerns that cannot be ignored.
Every proposed change to the law on close-out netting must be carefully scrutinized. Any proposed expansion of close-out netting should be
presumed to be unwarranted unless there is compelling evidence to the
contrary. In addition, lawmakers must periodically review the efficacy of
all close-out netting laws now in place, particularly those that exempt
derivative transactions from the usual provisions of insolvency law.
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